Anthropic is somehow both too dangerous to allow and essential to national security

· · 来源:novel资讯

Agent 指挥 Agent —— 专为自动化编排设计,CLI 完全自描述,任何具备 shell 执行能力的 Agent 都能自主驱动

Returning back to the Anthropic compiler attempt: one of the steps that the agent failed was the one that was more strongly related to the idea of memorization of what is in the pretraining set: the assembler. With extensive documentation, I can’t see any way Claude Code (and, even more, GPT5.3-codex, which is in my experience, for complex stuff, more capable) could fail at producing a working assembler, since it is quite a mechanical process. This is, I think, in contradiction with the idea that LLMs are memorizing the whole training set and uncompress what they have seen. LLMs can memorize certain over-represented documents and code, but while they can extract such verbatim parts of the code if prompted to do so, they don’t have a copy of everything they saw during the training set, nor they spontaneously emit copies of already seen code, in their normal operation. We mostly ask LLMs to create work that requires assembling different knowledge they possess, and the result is normally something that uses known techniques and patterns, but that is new code, not constituting a copy of some pre-existing code.

MPs say。业内人士推荐搜狗输入法下载作为进阶阅读

The big finding: Claude Code builds, not buys. Custom/DIY is the most common single label extracted, appearing in 12 of 20 categories (though it spans categories while individual tools are category-specific). When asked “add feature flags,” it builds a config system with env vars and percentage-based rollout instead of recommending LaunchDarkly. When asked “add auth” in Python, it writes JWT + bcrypt from scratch. When it does pick a tool, it picks decisively: GitHub Actions 94%, Stripe 91%, shadcn/ui 90%.

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Bill Clint